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ABSTRACT
Wireless networking relies on a fundamental building block,
neighbor discovery (ND). However, the nature of wireless
communications makes attacks against ND easy: an adver-
sary can simply replay or relay (wormhole) packets across
the network and mislead disconnected nodes they commu-
nicate directly. Such attacks can compromise the overly-
ing protocols and applications. Proposals in the literature
seek to secure ND, allowing nodes to verify they are neigh-
bors. However, they either rely on specialized hardware or
infrastructure, or offer limited security, often only against
an attack mounted by at most two adversarial nodes (a
2-end wormhole). In this paper, we address these prob-
lems, designing a secure neighbor verification protocol for
low-cost and constrained Wireless Sensor networks (WSN).
Our scheme relies on nodes’ distance estimation and simple
geometric tests, and it is fully distributed. We prove our
protocol secure against the classical 2-end wormhole attack,
and we show it makes it hard to mount a k-end wormhole
attack (k > 2): For non-negligible yet limited chance of suc-
cess, the adversary must know the locations of all victim
nodes and deploy a relay (wormhole) node close to each vic-
tim. We provided a proof-of-concept implementation with
off-the-shelf WSN equipment, Cricket Motes. The protocol
is the first applicable method that achieves a high level of
security for WSN against sophisticated wormhole attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Neighbor discovery (ND) provides the essential functional-
ity for wireless devices to be able to discover others that are
within range or can communicate directly, with across the
wireless medium. This is a fundamental building block for
wireless networking and a multitude of applications, rout-
ing being the most essential in the context of Wireless Sen-
sor Networks (WSN). Nonetheless, the nature of wireless
communications makes it easy to abuse ND. Consider two
sensor motes A and B, out of each other’s range, and an
adversary that controls two relay nodes M and W , within
range of A and B, respectively. The adversarial node M
receives packets from A, relays them to W in order to be
retransmitted to B. The result is that A and B are misled,
through a false link, they are neighbors whereas they are
not. Consequently, such an adversary can control the vic-
tims’ communication, or more generally, can control multi-
hop communication by shortening communication paths and
manipulating other system’s operations. For example, once
the network needs to transmit a time-critical alarm, the ad-
versary is able to cut-off the fictitious links and prevents the
detection of the event by the network’s authority.
The importance of “wormhole” or “relaying” attack on
wireless networks has been identified in the literature, es-
pecially due to the fact that it is easy for an adversary to
act at the physical layer without any node compromise or
possession of cryptographic keys. Secure neighbor discov-
ery aims to thwart this attack, essentially, to identify as
neighbors only nodes that are indeed neighbors. This can
be achieved as a two-stage approach: first, potential neigh-
bors are discovered in a typical manner; then, a neighbor
verification protocol verifies which nodes are indeed neigh-
bors, to achieve secure ND. However, a neighbor verification
protocol does not have to be complete, i.e. able to discover
and verify all actual neighbors. Nonetheless, it can detect
an adversary trying to create false links1.
As corroborated by a recent impossibility result for a broad
class of secure wireless ND protocols, run by two correct
nodes in the presence of the wormhole, it is quite challeng-
ing, in general, to verify communication neighborhood, i.e.,
discovering other nodes it can directly communicate with
[17]. Hence, in practice, secure ND protocols often approxi-
mate it with physical neighborhood, where nodes prove they
are in vicinity of each other.
A number of solutions to secure ND have been proposed
thus far. However, as our survey in Sec. 2 reveals, many of
them are not generally applicable to WSN, either because
they utilize specialized hardware or because they require ad-
ditional infrastructure. Besides, those which are applicable
offer relatively limited security, often focusing on adversaries
mounting 2-end wormhole attacks.
In this paper, we take on the challenge of designing a pow-
erful and secure neighbor verification protocol that adheres
to the limited hardware capabilities of WSN. At the same
time, we realize that a 2-end wormhole is in fact a limited
type of relay attack: an adversary might mount k > 2 nodes
and therefore relays traffic among correct nodes (victims)
through the attack network. Our objective is to be resilient
even against such a more powerful adversary that mounts
what we term a k-end wormhole attack. Overall, there has
been, to the best of our knowledge, no concerted effort to
design secure ND protocols that address these two problems
and achieve acceptable level of security in WSN.
1It is the task of an intrusion response system to find the
best possible reaction to the detected attack, but this is
outside of the scope of this paper.
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We develop a solution to address precisely these chal-
lenges. We design a secure neighbor verification protocol
that is practical for low-cost WSN motes, as demonstrated
by our implementation. Nodes estimate their distance to
others in their vicinity, and exchange information about
their estimates. Then, a series of simple geometric tests
is run by each node over this local neighborhood view it
obtained, in order to detect topology distortions created by
wormhole attacks. The attack is detected if the distortion
is beyond what is expected to happen as a result of channel
error. Tested neighbors that do not reveal any distortion
and also pass the verification test are verified to be physical
neighbors and thus communication neighbors.
Our results show these tests are highly effective. First, our
scheme is provably secure 2against classical 2-end wormhole,
no matter how fast messages of correct nodes can be relayed,
and independently of the adversary knowledge (e.g., correct
nodes’ location). Through simulation results, we demon-
strate our scheme makes the network highly resilient against
k-end relay attacks. Without centimeter-precision knowl-
edge of correct nodes’ locations, which is hard to obtain,
the adversary has only a negligible chance to create false
links and avoid being detected. Yet, even with such knowl-
edge, the attacker is extremely limited and needs to deploy
approximately one relay node per victim. Our distributed
solution is independent of the technology nodes use to es-
timate distance to other nodes. Nonetheless, our proof-of-
concept implementation relies on off-the-shelf WSN equip-
ment: Cricket motes that rely on ultra-sound (US) ranging.
We emphasize on the effectiveness of our scheme that utilizes
a secure ranging, tailored to our security requirements, even
though the simple US ranging is susceptible to relatively
simple attack [19]. Overall, our contributions in this paper
are: (i) the first secure ND scheme tailored for low-cost wire-
less nodes, notably in a WSN, (ii) the provable security of
the protocol against a 2-end wormhole, (iii) investigation of
a more general k-end relay attack, (iv) the effectiveness of
our protocol against such stronger adversaries, and (v) the
implementation and experimental evaluation of our secure
ND in a WSN.
We study existing secure ND schemes in Sec. 2. System
model is described in Sec. 3. Consequently, Sec. 4 presents
our protocol and in Sec. 5 we analyze its security and perfor-
mance. Next, in Sec. 6 we explain the experimental results.
Some issues are discussed in Sec. 7 before Sec. 8 presents the
future work and concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
A number of secure neighbor discovery schemes have been
proposed in the literature. We briefly survey schemes which
are not generally applicable to WSN, because of special
hardware requirements or dependance on additional infras-
tructure. Then, we discuss in more detail the applicable
schemes and compare them with our proposal.
The scheme proposed in [7] develops a wormhole attack
detection using directional antennas, which are not com-
mon for WSN. RF-fingerprinting, i.e., recognizing a wireless
transceiver based on unique features of the signal it gener-
ates, has been considered in [18]. However, the signal analy-
sis that this scheme performs is not feasible for a typical sen-
2Except an arguably infeasible case that the adversary has
to mount its node on top of victims.
sor mote radio receiver. Geographical packet leashes [8] rely
on location information to estimate distance between the
nodes, and thus prevent wormhole attacks. However, node
knowledge of secure location is a requirement hard to fulfil in
many settings. In particular, secure localization schemes for
WSN require additional infrastructure such as a number of
location-aware beacons [20]. This kind of additional infras-
tructure is also the basis of a wormhole prevention scheme
proposed in [16].
Another way to estimate distance between nodes is to es-
timate message time-of-flight between two nodes: either for
the ultra-sound medium [13], or for RF, e.g., [8] or [21]. The
former is not secure in general: An adversary can decrease
the distance by relaying a slow US signal over a light-speed
RF or wired relay link. However, in our scheme we leverage
on the presence of multiple correct nodes to detect these at-
tacks. The latter is problematic, especially in the context
of sensor networks, given the light-speed propagation of RF
waves. To precisely estimate the distance, nanosecond pre-
cision is required, well beyond the capabilities of existing
sensor motes.
Nevertheless, it is possible to measure the RF time-of-
flight with the best precision available, as proposed [12] for
generic wireless networks, in [5] for 802.11, or [1] for WSN.
Our protocol utilizes this method as well. The available pre-
cision allows to thwarts store-and-forward wormhole attacks
as well as to prevent a more sophisticated adversary from
creating very long false links. However, false links spanning
over few hops are not detected. Hence, our protocol also
includes more sophisticated defense mechanisms.
Two centralized approaches that rely on approximate dis-
tance measurements [22] or only connectivity information [3]
have been proposed. Both are essentially implementable on
WSNs, but have some drawbacks. The former visualizes the
network and requires user interaction to localize the worm-
holes, limiting its applicability. The latter detects wormhole
attacks based on abnormal values of some statistics of the
connectivity graph, but this requires assumption about the
expected values of these statistics. Further, no information
about the location of the wormhole is provided if one is de-
tected.
A distributed scheme that relies on only connectivity in-
formation detects wormhole attacks by checking for forbid-
den structures in the connectivity graph [10]. A forbidden
structure is a graph that is very unlikely to be observed
as a subgraph of a legitimate connectivity graph, but often
appearing under a wormhole attack: The precise form of
these structures depends on the connectivity pattern. The
method proposed in [10] demonstrates good performance
(specifically high detection rates) for dense networks when
evaluated (with simulations) under theoretical connectivity
patterns (unit-disk model (UDG), quasi-UDG model and
the TOSSIM model). However, the scheme has not been in-
vestigated in a real deployment, with a high irregularity of
antenna patterns [24]. Under such conditions, the authors
of [10] propose to empirically estimate the forbidden struc-
tures in a part of the network free from wormhole attacks.
This can be a substantial overhead, and can prove impos-
sible in some applications. On the contrary, although our
scheme also has some deployment-specific parameters which
should be estimated empirically, these parameters are non-
essential, i.e., are only used by secondary security mecha-
nisms. These mechanisms can be turned off if estimation is
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Figure 1: A 5-end Relay Attack.
not feasible. Furthermore, the security of this scheme is not
analyzed under k-end relay attacks.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a static WSN with sensor nodes (motes), A,
B, . . . ., distributed across a field. For the sake of simplicity,
our analysis assumes nodes are deployed on a plane, but
our protocol can easily be extended for nodes deployed in
three dimensions. Nodes are correct, i.e., follow the protocol.
The distance from A to B as measured by A, is denoted by
dAB , whereas |AB| denotes the actual (Euclidean) distance
between nodes (or points) A and B.
Each node is equipped with two network interfaces: a
radio-frequency (RF) and a sound (typically, ultrasound (US))
interface. R is the range of the US technology, s = 342m/s
is the speed of sound, and c = 3× 108 is the speed of light.
We call two nodes, A and B, neighbors if and only if they
are in physical proximity of each other, i.e., |AB| < R, and
they can communicate directly in a symmetric way using
both US and RF.
Nodes can perform cryptographic operations with a sym-
metric key K: encryption (EK{.}), message authentication
code (MACK{.}), and hash or one-way functions (H{.})
computations. They can also generate fresh random nonces.
Every pair of nodes, A, B, running a ND protocol shares a
symmetric key, KAB . Symmetric keys can be established by
one of the many key distribution schemes in the literature,
as detailed in Sec. 4.
Adversary Model We are mainly concerned about ex-
ternal adversary that cannot compromise correct nodes or
their cryptographic keys. The adversary controls a relay
network composed of a number of relay nodes that we also
term wormhole ends. The relay nodes are fully connected by
out-of-band relay links, over which information propagates
with speed equal to c. In our model, a relay node repre-
sents a pair of exactly one radio (RF) and one ultrasound
(US) antenna. We model a sophisticated relay node that can
simultaneously send and receive US signals (without caus-
ing interference on its own receiver) as two relay nodes. In
other words, each attacker’s US-RF antenna (directional or
omnidirectional) is considered as a relay node.
If the regions under the control of the adversary, that is,
the regions within range of the wormhole ends, do not over-
lap (i.e. no valid link exists between correct nodes in differ-
ent regions), we term the attack a remote attack. Moreover,
we assume the adversary to be capable of relaying messages
on a per-symbol basis (i.e. messages are relayed in physical
layer and the adversary is not limited to store-and-forward).
The processing time at the receiving and sending relay
nodes is considered to be below 1µ sec. As the reception
time of a US message is estimated with microsecond preci-
sion, such relaying delay has negligible effect on US-based
distance measurement. This is so when the attacker relays
US signals over short links. However, long relay links (above
300m) introduce non-negligible delay (a few microseconds)
to messages.
Messages (both RF and US) eavesdropped by a relay node
can be selectively discarded, modified, delayed, or replicated
before being relayed by another node. The adversary can
also inject new messages into the network, but it is com-
putationally bounded and unable to mount cryptanalytic
attacks or to guess fresh nonces.
We distinguish a number of parameters characterizing the
adversary. First, the size of the relay network: a k-end at-
tack is an attack that involves k relay nodes. An example of
a relay network consist of 5 nodes is depicted in Fig. 1. The
adversary can be topology aware, meaning that it knows the
locations of all correct nodes (in the vicinity of wormhole
ends); otherwise it is topology oblivious. Finally, a topology-
aware adversary might mount a post-deployment attack that
enables it to deploy the relay network knowing the physical
position of correct nodes after they have been deployed in
the field or it might be forced to deploy the relay nodes with-
out this knowledge; i.e. mounting a pre-deployment attack,
before the correct nodes have been placed at their positions.
4. THE SCHEME
After deployment, nodes establish security associations
(SAs): a key establishment protocol, with numerous pro-
posals in the literature, e.g., [6, 2, 4, 25], installs symmet-
ric pairwise keys for communicating nodes. At this stage,
there is no guarantee that nodes that appear neighbors are
indeed so. Our secure neighbor verification protocol will ad-
dress this, relying on the SAs. The protocol is intended to
run after most of the WSN nodes are deployed and SAs es-
tablished, even though false links naturally can exist. The
higher the network density, the higher will be the effective-
ness of the verification protocol. If the network topology
changes significantly, by the operator relocating nodes or
deploying new nodes, the protocol is re-executed. Basically,
the protocol consists of a number of phases we describe in
detail further below in this section:
(i) Ranging Given a list of potential neighbors, every
node attempts to calculate its distance to each neighbor us-
ing ultrasound ranging. Ranging is done in a secure manner,
meaning that adversarial behavior is restricted to the relay-
ing of messages via the relay network.
(ii) Neighbor Table Exchange After the ranging phase,
every node shares with each of its neighbors (in an authen-
ticated manner) the neighbor table, including the distances
calculated in the ranging phase.
(iii) Link Verification With the information obtained
during the neighbor table exchange, the node constructs a 2-
hop neighbor table, which then locally (i.e. without further
communication with other nodes) undergoes a battery of
consistency tests. Consequently, an attack can be detected,
and links can be discarded or verified.
The protocol operates with a set of five parameters ad-
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Figure 2: Ranging Protocol. The initiator node A
sends the REQ message to each of its neighbors, here
B and C. Each neighbor replies to complete the
synchronization. Then, the RNG message is sent
over the US medium. Finally, the information in
the ACK message allows neighbors of A to verify
clock synchronization and ranging and to calculate
the distance based on the US time of flight.
justed based on the physical characteristics of the commu-
nication channel. θsym represents the acceptable fraction
of links with asymmetric length (distance between incident
nodes) due to the US signals irregularity. θrange represents
the acceptable fraction of links reported to be longer than R,
due to the distance measurement error. sym is a bound on
the amount of link asymmetry error. quad is the bound on
the error of determining if four points are part of a quadri-
lateral on a plane (e.g., being a tetrahedron). Finally, sync
is the bound on propagation delay error estimation. The val-
ues of these  bounds are tradeoff between security and false
alarm (and miss) rate. We choose rather conservative values,
such that practically no false alarms happen. Moreover, all
 values are deployment-independent, and it will be shown
later on we can harmlessly consider worst-case constant θ
values. Aa a result, our scheme is deployment independent.
4.1 Ranging
A three-step ranging protocol is executed once by every
node in the network. The first step of the ranging phase
allows the initiator node, A, synchronizing with its (po-
tential) neighbors (with microsecond precision) and is per-
formed over RF. This is not really synchronization; rather,
the difference between clocks readings at A and a potential
neighbor B is determined by both A and B. The second
step, performed over US, is the actual ranging. This oper-
ation is done simultaneously for all neighbors, significantly
limiting the adversary behavior if it wants to remain unde-
tected. The last acknowledgement step finalizes the ranging
and secures the synchronization. Fig. 2 illustrates one exe-
cution of the ranging protocol between node A and two of
its neighbors B and C.
Synchronization The initiator, A, first sends via RF a
REQ message to neighbor B. The REQ message contains
an encrypted freshly generated nonce: NrB , which is different
for every neighborB and is used to authenticate the response
from B. It also contains the hash function value of a freshly
generated nonce Ns, used for ranging, which is the same
for all neighbors of A. The whole message, including the
header, is authenticated with a MAC using the shared secret
key between A and B. Having received such a message, if
the MAC is correct and NrB has not been seen or generated
as a nonce before, node B records the time of reception
tBREQ and replies with the REP message, which contains
the nonce, NrB , while recording the time of sending t
B
REP .
When A receives the REP message, it records the time of
reception tAREP , to be used in the acknowledgement step.
This procedure is repeated for each neighbor of A.
A
RF−−→ B : 〈REQ,EKAB{NrB}, H(Ns),MACKAB{.}〉
A : tAREQ := Sending time of REQ.
B : tBREQ := Reception time of REQ.
B : If NrB is fresh and MAC is correct continue:
B
RF−−→ A : 〈REP,NrB〉
B : tBREP := Sending time of REP .
A : tAREP := Reception time of REP .
Ranging The initiator A, broadcasts the ranging message
RNG over US and records the transmission time tARNG. The
message consists of a string of bits: a single digit 1 concate-
nated with the nonce Ns generated in the synchronization
step. The purpose of transmitting a single digit 1 is to act
as preamble and simplify the detection of the message start
time at the receiver. Every neighbor B receiving this mes-
sage records the time of reception tBRNG, along with the re-
ceived nonce NsB .
A
US−−→ ∗ : 〈1||Ns〉
A : tARNG := Sending Time of RNG
B : tBRNG := Reception time of RNG
B : NsB := Received RNG nonce
Acknowledgement To conclude the ranging operation,
the initiator, A, sends an ACK message to every neighbor
that has replied correctly in the synchronization step.
A : If B has sent correct REP :
A
RF−−→ B : 〈ACK,Ns, tAREQ, tAREP , tARNG,MACKAB{.}〉
B : If MAC is correct and Ns = NsB , and
If |(tAREP − tAREQ)− (tBREP − tBREQ)| < sync:
dBA ← ((tBRNG − tBREQ)− (tARNG − tAREQ))× s
The ACK message contains Ns, to bind it to the ear-
lier transmitted REQ and RNG messages, and three time-
stamps: tAREQ, t
A
REP and t
A
RNG. They allow B to check if
synchronization was done correctly, i.e. no delay beyond the
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propagation delay (which is below 1µs for RF communica-
tion at the range we are considering) was introduced while
the messages were in transit. It also checks if the received
nonce in the ranging phase, NsB , is equal toN
s (that was sent
by A). If checks are successful, B uses the time-stamps to
calculate the distance to A. To provide authentication and
integrity, the ACK message also includes the MAC over all
its content.
4.2 Neighbor Table Exchange
The neighbor table NTA, constructed by every node A
in the network, contains the identifiers and distances to all
neighbors that were previously properly ranged. Neighbors
for which ranging failed are not included in the table. The
table is broadcasted (authenticated for all neighbors) within
the NTE message, as shown below. Every node A com-
bines its own NTA and the received neighbor tables from its
neighbors into the 2-hop neighbor table NT2A, to be used
in the link verification phase.
A
RF−−→ ∗ : 〈NTE,NTA,MACKAB{.},MACKAC{.}, . . .〉
4.3 Link Verification
The link verification consists of three steps as part of
which a node A runs consistency tests on the 2-hop neigh-
bor table NT2A. If at any point a link is discarded, it is
ignored in subsequent steps. The protocol will continue the
verification even after an attack is detected, so that informa-
tion on all discovered links is obtained and then utilized to
analyze the attack (e.g., for intrusion detection). The link
verification three tests are:
(i) Link Symmetry Test. Any link (U, V ) for which
the distance measured by U is different from the distance
measured by V is discarded, which applies also to links for
which only one measurement is available. If a fraction of
more than θsym such links exists, an attack is detected.
for all U, V ∈ NT2A do
if |dUV − dV U | > sym then
remove links (U, V ) and (V,U) from NT2A
increase Cntsym
if Cntsym/(#links in NT2A) > θsym then
attack detected
(ii) Maximum Range Test. Links which are longer
than the range R are discarded. An attack is detected if a
fraction of more than θrange links is discarded.
for all U, V ∈ NT2A do
if dUV > R then
remove links (U, V ) and (V,U) from NT2A
increase Cntrange
if Cntrange/(#links in NT2A) > θrange then
attack detected
(iii) Quadrilateral Test. In the last step, A looks at
every 4-clique3in NT2A to which it belongs. If any of them
is not a quadrilateral within quad error tolerance (i.e. it is
a tetrahedron with positive volume), an attack is detected.
Moreover, a link is declared verified if it is a part of a convex
quadrilateral.We note that after all the 4-cliques have been
checked, some links might not be discarded, but not declared
verified neither. We explain in Sec. 7 how these links can be
treated. Next, we describe the components of quadrilateral
test in more details.
3Note that as this is a clique and that A knows the lengths
Figure 3: Quadrilateral Test.
for all B,C,D ∈ NT2A do
if {A,B,C,D} is a 4-clique then
if {A,B,C,D} fails Quadrilateral Test then
adversary detected
else if {A,B,C,D} is convex then
mark all links in {A,B,C,D} verified
Quadrilateral Test. To test if a 4-clique forms a quadri-
lateral, one can check if it is possible to assign (locally) po-
sitions to the nodes such that no contradiction arises. This
can be done as follows (Fig. 3): Assign position (0, 0) to
A, (0, dAB) to B; check if dAB , dBC , dCA form a triangle,
i.e. if all 3 triangle inequalities hold. If not, there is a con-
tradiction. Otherwise, assign position (xC , yC) to C, where
yC = (d
2
AB + d
2
AC − d2BC)/(2dAB) and xC = (d2AC − y2C)
1
2 .
Further, check triangle inequalities for dAB , dBD, dDA; if
they hold, there are two possible positions for D: (xD, yD)
and (−xD, yD), where yD = (d2AB + d2AD − d2BD)/(2dAB)
and xD = (d
2
AD − y2D)
1
2 . For both positions, check if the
difference between the measured length dCD and the length
of CD determined by the calculated positions of C and D
is within quad bounds. If it is not in both cases, the dis-
tances do not belong to a quadrilateral. Otherwise, assign
to D the matching position. It is worth mentioning that,
the quad is calculated based on the propagation of distance
measurement error in the this test.
Convexity and Co-Linearity Test. Given the positions
computed in the quadrilateral test above, we test if the
quadrilateral is convex whereas none of its 3 points are
collinear. For the former, compute the product of four cross
products (
−→
AB × −−→BC)(−−→BC × −−→CD)(−−→CD × −−→DA)(−−→DA × −→AB) –
if it is positive, the quadrilateral is convex, if it is negative
it is concave. To test the latter, check if the absolute value
of any of these cross products is lower than quad.
5. SCHEME ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme, in
presence of 2-end and k-end attack, and also evaluate its
performance in a benign setting.
5.1 Ranging
For this part of the analysis, we assume A and B are
correct nodes executing the ranging protocol, with A be-
ing the initiator. The adversary is a topology-aware, post-
deployment k-end relay network, and knows any key except
of all 6 links.
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the key shared by A and B. Under these assumptions, the
ranging protocol satisfies the following properties:
(r1) If the protocol terminates successfully and B calcu-
lates dBA, then either dBA ≈ |AB| or dBA ≈ (|AWA|+
|WBB|+ τ), where WA and WB are some relay nodes
close to A and B, respectively, and τ is the distance
corresponding to the additional delay that the adver-
sary imposes when relaying over the relay network).
(r2) The protocol prevents the creation of very long false
links, i.e., links that span more than 0.5c× sync.
(r3) The protocol prevents the creation of any false link by
a store-and-forward adversary.
According to the ranging protocol, if B calculates the dis-
tance, the following has happened (in this order, ti are in
global time):
(1) At time t1, recorded as t
B
REQ byB, nodeB has received
messagem1 = 〈REQ,EKAB{NrB}, H(Ns),MACKAB{.}〉,
with nonce NrB not seen or generated before by B;
(2) At time t2, recorded as t
B
REP by B, node B has sent
message m2 = 〈REP,NrB〉;
(3) At time t3, recorded as t
B
RNG by B, node B has re-
ceived a RNG message m3 = 1||Ns, with Ns neither
seen nor generated before by B;
(4) Node B has received the following message with tAREQ
and tAREP passing the synchronization test:
m4 = 〈ACK,Ns, tAREQ, tAREP , tARNG,MACKAB{.}〉
Message m1 is authenticated, and hence can be generated
only by A or B. As B checks that NrB is not self-generated,
node A had to generate m1 and send it at some point in
time t0 < t1, recorded as t
A
REQ by A.
Likewise, m4 can be generated only by A: node B is ruled
out because it would never generate an ACK message for
a nonce Ns it has not generated itself. Node A would only
send the ACK message for B, if at some time t2.1, recorded
as tAREP , node A has received the REP message to its REQ
message sent at t0. The only acceptable REP message is
m2, and because the nonce N
r
B is fresh and encrypted in m1,
only B can generate this REP message. Hence, t2.1 > t2
and further t0 < t1 < t2 < t2.1. Combined with the fact that
the synchronization test was successful in (4), this allows to
conclude that within an acceptable bound sync at time t1
the clock of A is equal to tAREQ and the clock of B is equal
to tBREQ.
From the above we instantly get (r2): The round trip
propagation delay is equal to (t2.1 − t0)− (t2 − t1) < sync,
which means that if the distance between A and B is longer
than 0.5c×sync the ranging will fail, and link (A,B) will be
discarded. Further, the store-and-forward adversary, which
cannot replay a message before it entirely receives it, is de-
tected in the synchronization phase. This is because such
an attacker introduces an additional delay, equal to the du-
ration of the exchanged messages, on the synchronization
phase. This delay is well above sync, hence (r3) follows.
When A broadcasts the RNG message m3 at some time
t2.2, it is the first time N
s is sent in clear. Thus, it is not
possible for any relay node to send m3 before some relay
node receives m3 sent by A at t2.2. Moreover, the integrity
of m4 is protected, hence B learns the actual time of sending
m3 measured with A clock: t
A
RNG. As we have shown that
the synchronization has been successful, B measures cor-
rectly, within an acceptable bound, the difference between
t2.2 and t3, the time at which it received the nonce. Thus
the distance B calculates is either |AB| (propagation over
the real link), or |AWA| + |WBB| + τ , where WA and WB
are some relay nodes close to A and B, respectively, and τ
is an additional delay that the adversary might choose to
impose (propagation over the relay network).
5.2 Symmetry Test
We show that for a given relay link the adversary, to avoid
being detected by the symmetry test needs to introduce a
single, constant (non-negative) delay in both directions. In-
deed, assume node A is on one side of the relay link, and
nodes B and C are on the other side. The adversary relays
the RNG message sent by node B and received (over the
wormhole) by node A with delay τ1, and relays the RNG
message sent by node C, also received (over the wormhole)
by node A, with delay τ2. Node A also sends a RNG mes-
sage, which needs to be received by both B and C if links
(A,B) and (A,C) are not to be discarded by the link symme-
try test. To further satisfy the symmetry test the adversary
needs to relay the RNG message of A with delay τ1 (for
symmetry of link (A,B)) and at the same time with delay
τ2 (for symmetry of link (A,C)). Hence τ1 = τ2.
5.3 Maximum Range Test
In this section, we quantify the effectiveness of the max-
imum range test. Consider a single relay link (W1,W2).
Without the maximum range test, any pair of nodesA (neigh-
bor of W1), B (neighbor of W2) in the range of the wormhole
ends (possibly more than R if the adversary uses superior an-
tennas) could be deceived into believing they are neighbors.
The maximum range test limits the number of vulnerable
pairs (A,B) by checking |AW1| + |BW2| 6 R. Therefore,
the maximum range test prevents the creation of a false link
if the distance from the respective relay nodes of either A
or B is above R. Moreover, the test limits by 83.33% the
fraction of vulnerable pairs among those with both correct
nodes within R of the relay nodes.
Pr((X + Y ) 6 R) =
∫ R
0
2x
R2
(
∫ R−x
0
2y
R2
dy)dx = 16.67%
where X and Y are the random variables representing
distance of (nodes’) positions to W1 and W2, respectively.
5.4 Security against 2-end Wormhole
In this section, we investigate the security of our scheme
against the most commonly considered relay attack: single
wormhole, that is a relay attack utilizing two remote worm-
hole ends. Further, we limit the analysis to the case where
nodes in communication range R are always able to com-
municate. Nevertheless, we consider the powerful external
topology-aware adversary that mounts a post-deployment
attack.
It is easy to show that an attempt to relay RNG message
between two nodes A and B on the same side of the worm-
hole fails. Indeed, the RNG message sent by A will reach
B directly before the relayed one does. The latter message
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Figure 4: 2-end Wormhole, 2-2 Attack. Circles denote correct nodes, squares denote wormhole ends, con-
tinuous lines denote real links, dashed lines denote links created over a wormhole. Rather than the actual
distance between W1 and W2, t represents the (non-negative) distance corresponding to the delay that the
adversary chooses to introduce on link (W1,W2).
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Figure 5: 2-end Wormhole, 3-1 Attack. Circles denote correct nodes, squares denote wormhole ends, contin-
uous lines denote real links, dashed lines denote links created over a wormhole.
will either be ignored, or it will collide with the former. In
neither case the relaying leads to an incorrect distance cal-
culation. Therefore, the adversary can only effectively relay
over the wormhole.
For convenience, we denote the areas on the opposite sides
of the wormhole as the left side of the wormhole and the right
side. To create a false link, the adversary needs to convince
4 nodes that they form a convex quadrilateral. There are
two choices in terms of the number of victim nodes located
on both sides of the wormhole: 2 nodes on each side (2-2),
and 3 nodes on one and 1 node on the other side of the
wormhole (3-1).
(2-2): We show that for this case the adversary is unable
to create any false links.
Denote the nodes on the left side of the wormhole as A,
B and the nodes on the right side of the wormhole as C,
D. Links AB and CD need to be legitimate, whereas links
AC, AD, BC and BD will be created over the wormhole
(see Fig. 4(a) for notation). There are two ways in which a
convex quadrilateral can be formed:
1. AB and CD are the opposite sides of a quadrilateral
(Fig. 4(b)). In this case:
|AC|+ |BD| = a+ b+ c+ d+ 2t = |AD|+ |BC|
However, in a quadrilateral (of positive volume) the
sum of diagonals (|AD| + |BC|) is always greater than
the sum of two opposite sides (|AC| + |BD|). This
contradiction implies that the adversary cannot suc-
ceed with this construction.
2. AB and CD are the diagonals of a convex quadrilateral
(Fig. 4(c)). Denote X to be the intersection of AB and
CD, with |AX|+|XB| = x and |CX|+|XD| = y. The
triangle inequalities for triangles ACX, BCX, BDX,
DAX in Fig. 4(c), added together, give x + y > a +
b + c + d + 2t > a + b + c + d. However, the triangle
inequalities for ABW1 and CDW2 in Fig. 4(a) give
x + y < a + b + c + d. This (second) contradiction
implies the adversary cannot create a false link in the
2-2 case.
(3-1): For this case the adversary can create false links
between at most one node from one side, but with an ar-
bitrary number of nodes from the other side, if and only if
this single node is located on top of the wormhole end (zero
distance) and the other 3 do not circumscribe the other side
of the wormhole.
Fig. 5(a) illustrates this attack. If t+ d = 0, which means
that the wormhole end is located in the same place as node
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D, and that the adversary adds negligible delay when relay-
ing the message, then from the perspective of correct nodes
D = W1, and ABCD forms a convex quadrilateral. Hence
all the false links AD, BD and CD will be verified.
Next, assume that τ = t + d > 0. Assume further the
adversary can convince the correct nodes that ABCD is a
quadrilateral. This means that AD, BD and CD inter-
sect in a single point (Fig. 5(b)). Then |AD| − |AW1| = τ ,
|BD|−|BW1| = τ and |CD|−|CW1| = τ . This implies that
A, B and C lie on a hyperbola with foci W1 and D, more
precisely on the hyperbola arm closer to W1 (Fig. 5(c)). As
this hyperbola arm is concave, no 3 points A, B, C can form
a convex quadrilateral with point D and hence validate false
links AD, BD or CD. Hence no false links can be verified.
Considering the attack in the t+d = 0 case, it’s applicabil-
ity and effectiveness are limited. First, a negligible relaying
delay is required. Second, deploying a relay node at a dis-
tance less than a few centimeters from a sensor mote might
be difficult considering their physical appearance. More-
over, such closely placed relay node would act as an obsta-
cle and would degrade communication of the node under
attack with its legitimate neighbors. Finally, even if the ad-
versary successfully mounts this attack, all the created links
are adjacent to one node – which is easily circumvented by
a node-disjoint route selection algorithm, e.g. [14].
5.5 Security against k-end Wormhole
In case of the k-end attack, although our protocol restricts
the adversary, it is possible to create false links. In this
section, we investigate via simulations to what extent our
scheme can effectively detect the attack. As in the previous
section, we consider nodes in range R to be communica-
tion neighbors. We analyze different types of adversaries:
topology-aware and topology-oblivious.
Every experiment is repeated for a range of network den-
sities, translating to average nodes’ degree from 3 to 20. For
each density, 1000 random topologies were tested. A topol-
ogy is a random deployment of nodes in the vicinity of relay
nodes. We assume that quad is 0.04×R (a pessimistic value,
much larger than the one we achieved in Sec. 6.2). For sim-
plicity, parameters θsym and θrange were set to 1; therefore,
effectively, detection is limited only to the quadrilateral test,
although all the test have been used for attack prevention.
Simulations were performed for 3-end and 4-end attacks.
Relay nodes can introduce positive relaying delay when re-
laying the RNG messages. We assumed the adversary is
sophisticated enough to apply the same delay on relayed
messages in both directions of each relay link, thus avoiding
detection with the link symmetry test. Hence, an adversar-
ial strategy is a sequence of 3 (3-end) or 6 (4-end) constant
delays selected for each relay link. A strategy is successful
if the adversary can create at least one verified false link
without being detected by the protocol. As the space of
all strategies is too large to perform an exhaustive search,
we used random selection sampling method. Thus, for each
topology, 104 strategies were investigated.
Fig. 6 illustrates the effectiveness of our protocol in the
presence of 3-end and 4-end topology-oblivious adversary.
Least square algorithm is used to fit polynomial degree two
on the results. The detection rate of the attack is an average
(over all examined topologies) of the fraction of strategies
that are detected by the protocol. To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our attack detection, topologies for which the
adversary cannot make any links over the wormhole (due to
maximum range test, described in Sec. 5.3) are not counted.
The success probability of the adversary is computed as the
average fraction of successful strategies, over all topologies.
However, because the success probability of the adversary is
extremely small (in the order of 10−6), we show the maxi-
mum success chance of the adversary strategies among in-
vestigated topologies. The 4-end adversary has full control
over all the false links, hence a higher chance to create false
links over the wormhole. Nonetheless, it is more probable to
be detected by the quadrilateral test, because the probabil-
ity of violation from creating quadrilaterals also increases.
The 3-end adversary is more limited because it is restricted
to 3 parameters in its strategies and also has control over 5
links in a 4-clique, hence a lower chance to even construct a
quadrilateral. The simulation results confirm this, as the 4-
end attack is slightly more successful than the 3-end attack.
Finally, for an adversary with more than 4 relay nodes, the
chance of success would decrease as the number of relay node
increases. Without the knowledge of precise nodes’ location,
the adversary is very likely to be detected.
According to the results, it is very probable for the topology-
oblivious adversary to be detected. Moreover, the success
probability of the attacker is extremely low. To evaluate
more powerful adversaries, in the following, we estimate the
effectiveness of our protocol in presence of 4-end topology-
aware adversary. The adversary searches among the sampled
strategies if there is any successful strategy for each topol-
ogy. Then, the best strategy that maximizes the number of
false links will be selected for perpetrating the attack. The
success probability of the adversary is computed as the frac-
tion of topologies for which there is at least one successful
strategy. The detection rate of the protocol calculated as
the number of topologies the attacker gets detected, over
the number of topologies that adversary can make any false
link. Because we do not examine all strategies, the results
provided by these simulations are only estimations for the
real rates. Figures 7(a) and 7(b) illustrate the result. As it
is shown, the success probability of the attacker decreases
as the density increases. This is because with increasing the
average degree the chance of creating an incorrect quadri-
lateral, and hence detection, increases, and results in low
success probability. Relatively low success in low density
networks is due to the fact that in most of the topologies
the adversary can not create any quadrilateral.
Still, the attack can be more sophisticated. Instead of re-
laying messages with default transmission power, a more so-
phisticated adversary can limit its transmission range (while
relaying the RNG message) sufficient to cover only the clos-
est nodes to its relay nodes, thus decreasing the chance of
being detected and hopeful to create verified false links. To
see what is the effectiveness of our protocol in presence of
such an adversary, we simulated such a power control policy
on a 4-end wormhole. The transmission range of each relay
point considered to be the distance to the closest node plus
10% of R (To make sure the victim receives the signals cor-
rectly). As it is shown in Figures 7(c) and 7(d), the attack
is more successful using the power control technique. Nev-
ertheless, the success of the adversary is limited due to the
fact that the smaller area is covered.
Thus far, we have not considered the attacker that mounts
a post-deployment attack, knowing the location of correct
nodes. Such a powerful topology-aware adversary that also
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(d) Detection Rate of 4-end Attack.
Figure 6: Topology-Oblivious Adversary
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(c) Success Chance for Adversary, with Power
Control.
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Figure 7: Topology Aware 4-end Attacker
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Figure 8: Coverage of the protocol.
controls its transmission power can create limited number
of verified false links in the network, by placing a relay node
close to 4 selected nodes, adjusting its power such that only
these nodes will receive the relayed messages and then pick-
ing the relay links delay appropriately. Further in Sec. 7 we
will discuss how hard implementing such an attack is and
how we can disallow the adversary of using this capability
with the help of other security protocols.
5.6 Performance Evaluation in benign setting
To be verified by our protocol, links have to satisfy the
convex quadrilateral test. Yet, even in a benign setting,
some links might not be an edge of any convex quadrilateral.
Such links will remain unverified. We discuss in Sec. 7 how
such links can be utilized, but in this section we evaluate the
number of such links as a function of network density using
simulation.
We distributed from 80 to 480 nodes uniformly in a field
measuring 400×400. The transmission range of nodes is 100.
We used the unit disk graph (UDG) model for determining
neighbors of nodes.
The coverage of the verification protocol is estimated as
the percentage of verifiable links. Fig. 8 shows the coverage
of the protocol vs. the average degree of nodes. As it is
shown, for the networks with average nodes’ degree above 7,
the coverage is more than 90% and the network is connected.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe how we implemented the pro-
tocol on sensor motes. Then, we will show the applicability
of our protocol through examining it in real deployment.
We used Cricket software v2 as the basis of our project
and TinyOS v1 [9] as the operating system installed on the
Cricket motes (Fig. 9). To make the ultrasound signal om-
nidirectional, we simply mounted a metal cone on top of the
motes (Fig. 9) to make the signals omnidirectional (similar
to what proposed in [23]).
6.1 Protocol Implementation
Neighbor Discovery. We implemented neighbor discov-
ery as a simple 3-way handshake mechanism. The neighbor
discovery process runs once when a mote is turned on. Be-
cause the key distribution protocol is orthogonal to our work,
we did not implement a complicated key exchange protocol.
Therefore, for simplicity, we assigned the cryptographic keys
to motes before the deployment.
Ranging. Ranging is the core component of the proto-
col. After a given node starts ranging, authenticated REQ
messages are sent repeatedly to all its neighbors every 100
milliseconds. This time interval is large enough to receive
the corresponding REP message from the demanded neigh-
bor. The sending and reception time of the first bit of data
segment for all REQ and REP messages are recorded using
(32-bit) microsecond local timers. The accurate reception
time of the messages is computed, after considering the de-
lay introduced by bit alignment and the interrupt handling
of packets in radio board (as described in [11]).
After finishing the synchronization phase, the initiator
generates a 150µs pulse of 40 KHz ultrasound using the US
transducer, as the signal for distance measurement. Then,
the ultrasound nonce, Ns, will be transmitted using a sim-
ple on-off modulation. Every 65 milliseconds, a similar US
pulse is sent if the corresponding bit of the nonce is 1. Oth-
erwise, no signal will be transmitted. The interval of send-
ing successive bits is large enough (65 milliseconds) to avoid
inter-symbol interference.
All receivers, upon receiving the first part of the ultra-
sound signal will store the arrival time to be used for dis-
tance measurement. To reconstruct the ultrasound nonce,
the receivers repeatedly listen to the channel. And in each
interval if they receive the signal it is considered as 1. In the
end, the assembled nonce is compared with the expected one
(sent in REQ) and the records are discarded in the case of
discrepancy.
Finally, the initiator sends the ACK message separately
to all of the neighbors. Upon receiving the ACK message,
nodes are able to calculate the distance and update their
neighbor table. To compute the distance, based on the sound
time of flight, we also considered the effect of the reflective
cone we used above the ultrasound transducer, which always
added 10cm to the measured distance.
Neighbor Table Exchange and Link Verification.
After finishing the ranging, nodes are supposed to broadcast
their Neighbor Table. In the current version of the imple-
mented protocol, nodes simply send the neighbor tables to
the base-station and security checks will be performed based
on those results in a computer connected to the base station
(just for simplifying the analysis).
6.2 Experimental Results
Between 10 and 15 nodes were deployed on the floor in
different topologies in a 4 × 4m room without any obsta-
cle in between. We placed nodes in different positions and
after running the protocol for several runs results were pro-
cessed off-line. To study to what extends the reflected cone
effects the accuracy of the measurement, we ran the proto-
col also when nodes were located in positions that (their US
transceivers) could directly face each other around a circle.
In all our experiments, ranging command were sent fre-
quently from BS to the network. For each experiment we let
the protocol run between 40 and 70 rounds. Here, we present
the results of the experiments, that confirm the applicability
of our protocol.
We investigate the applicability of the protocol in terms
of the time synchronization, distance measurement, and link
symmetry errors, due to the wireless medium irregularity.
Time Synchronization Error. Analyzing the results
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Figure 9: Crickets with reflective cones above the
ultrasound transducers.
of all synchronization data (time-stamps) during the exper-
iments, we learned that 99.55% of them met the constraints
and only 0.45% of cases discarded because of synchroniza-
tion error was more than a sync = 5µs
4 threshold.
Distance Measurement Error. Nodes could reliably
range each other for distances up to 4 meters when they
were deployed on the floor with the cones on top of the
transmitter unit. In these conditions, we achieved a maxi-
mum error of 5cm. In face to face deployment, the maximum
transmission range was 10 meters with error below 3cm.
Link Symmetry Error. For each pair of nodes, we com-
pared the difference between the distance estimated by two
end nodes for their link as the link symmetry error. This is
used to adjust both sym and quad parameters. The symme-
try error was below 7cm for 97% of the cases (while it was
below 2cm for 74% of the cases). When the motes where
placed in a circle of 4m diameter, facing each other, the
maximum symmetry error of 2cm was experienced for 97%
of the links.
7. DISCUSSION
Unverified Links The protocol definition does not spec-
ify how to treat links that are neither discarded nor verified.
The simplest and arguably most secure option is to discard
them. However, these links could be beneficial to routing
protocols, by increasing the diversity of the nodes topology
view. Links in the neighbor table with an unverified status
could have low but not zero probability of being selected as
part of a route. This could be useful in low density net-
works, where the fraction of unverified links is significant,
in contrast to strict rejection policy that might dampen or
even prevent network-wide communication.
Topology-aware Adversaries Among all types of re-
lay adversaries, topology-aware ones are the most powerful
ones: they can deploy their relay network knowing the lo-
cations of correct nodes, and use power control to lower the
risk of detection risk. However, knowing the network topol-
ogy and node locations is not trivial. Even if the adversary
manages to do this, its impact can be mitigated by an ap-
propriate design. To reduce a topology-aware adversary into
a topology-oblivious adversary, the system should force the
adversary to deploy its relay nodes before the network de-
4It corresponds to less than 2mm of sound propagation.
ployment, thus disabling its choosing positions relative to
those of correct nodes. The unpredictability of RF signals
makes it hard for the adversary to infer precise locations
before correct nodes commence ranging, thus, overall, the
attacker would be topology-oblivious, unless of course the
adversary obtained the network map by other means, e.g.
manually. If protocols such as LEAP [25], which limit node
shared key establishment within seconds from their being
powered up at deployment, are used, the adversary must
deploy its relay network in advance. This way, the adver-
sary’s power can be reduced to power of topology-oblivious
one, with the drastically reduced effectiveness (Sec. 5).
Internal Adversaries In Sec. 5, we analyze the secu-
rity of our scheme mostly against an external adversary, the
type of adversary typically assumed in the literature for two
reasons. A relay attack is naturally an external one. More-
over, internal adversaries cannot be, in general, defeated.
Consider two corrupt nodes, A and B, with A sharing its
credentials with B, allowing B to convince all its neighbors
that A is a neighbor. In the light of this attack, it is reason-
able to focus on links only between two non-corrupted nodes.
However, many schemes, including ours, rely on information
from additional nodes to verify links. Hence, even if the two
nodes incident to a link in question are correct, false infor-
mation from another node could potentially mislead them
into falsely believing they are neighbors.
Due to the fact that sensor motes are inexpensive devices
that can be tampered with, node corruption is feasible. For
simplicity, we consider a relay network in possession of pri-
vate keys obtained by corrupting m legitimate sensor motes.
As shown in Sec. 5.1, the adversary cannot decrease the dis-
tance between two correct nodes. However, it can decrease
the distance between a non-corrupted node and a relay node
posing as a regular sensor mote (by sending the RNG mes-
sage before tARNG as declared in the ACK message). In
addition, the adversary can also cheat during the neighbor
table exchange phase, reporting arbitrary distances between
two corrupted nodes. The creation of a few false links be-
comes easier: for example, a 2-end wormhole with 2 cor-
rupted credentials can be used to convince two nodes they
are neighbors. Nevertheless, a preliminary analysis hints
that creating a large number of links, compared to the num-
bers of wormhole ends, k, and corrupted nodes, m, is not
feasible, similarly to the external adversary case.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We designed a secure neighbor verification protocol tai-
lored for wireless sensor networks. To demonstrate its appli-
cability to WSN, we provided a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation on existing off-the-shelf hardware (Cricket motes).
We proved that the protocol is secure against the classical
2-end wormhole attack. Moreover, through the simulations
we demonstrated the infeasibility of mounting a successful
k-end attack in the network. In fact, even such a powerful
adversary is highly limited and is not able to make more
than a few negligible fake links over the wormhole, compar-
ing to the size of the attack network itself. Besides, the
attacker will be detected with high probability, even though
some fake links are made.
In future work, we intend to have a more extensive anal-
ysis of the protocol, notably for the topology-aware adver-
sary, in order to estimate theoretical bounds on the attack’s
power. We also see potential for extending our scheme. For
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one, the scheme should be relatively easy augmentable to 3D
networks by replacing the quadrilateral test with its equiv-
alent one in new setting. Moreover, other techniques to es-
timate the distance between motes are worthy to be imple-
mented as (probably better) alternatives for US-based mea-
surement. Finally, developing a scheme that enforces higher
level of limits on the internal adversaries would surely be
worthwhile, but challenging as well; in fact, virtually all of
the existing secure neighbor discovery proposals assume an
external adversary, which hints about the difficulty of this
problem.
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